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RATIONALISING THE POLICY MESS? 1 
Abstract 
Procedures for the ex ante assessment of public policies are currently in vogue across 
the OECD. Their design is typically informed by an instrumentally rational model of 
problem solving, which assumes that knowledge is collected, evaluated and then trans-
lated straightforwardly into 'better policies'. This model has, it seems, been little af-
fected by more than three decades of academic research which has demonstrated tha
the reality of every-day policy-making is far messier. This paper analyses whether the 
uptake of ex ante assessment of policies is nonetheless capable of providing new op-
portunities for knowledge to inform processes of policy deliberation and learning. 
Drawing on an analysis of policy assessment procedures in three countries and the 
European Commission, it finds that there are several ways in which assessment knowl-
edge is used in the policy process. Moreover, its argues that policy learning occurs de-
spite, rather than because of the instrumental design of the new assessment proce-
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Introduction 
“We are living in interesting times for anyone concerned with the theory and practice 
of appraisal” (Owens et al, 2004: 1944). Formal procedures for policy level ex ante as-
sessment are currently experiencing a remarkable level of interest in the European Un-
ion (EU) (Jacob et al, 2007; Radaelli 2005), but also well beyond (OECD 1997; 2004). 
These procedures come in different guises, such as Regulatory Impact Assessment 
(RIA), Sustainability Impact Assessment and Impact Assessment (IA), and seek to 
achieve different things (Radaelli, 2005). Broadly speaking they all aim to identify the 
major impacts of a proposed new policy, are carried out before the final decision on the 
policy is taken, follow a formal administrative procedure and result in a formal report 
or statement. While the set-up and diffusion of these procedures has been the focus of 
a number of comparative studies (e.g. OECD, 1997 and 2004; Radaelli, 2005), the exist-
ing literature has little to say about what, if any, impact they have on the actual proc-
esses and outputs of policy making. This is somewhat curious given that their underly-
ing aim is precisely ‘to inform decision makers by predicting and evaluating the conse-
quences of various activities according to certain conventions’ (Owens et al, 2004: 1944). 
Our purpose in this paper is to go beyond simply describing the different assessment 
procedures in various jurisdictions and/or reviewing their quality based on a documen-
tary analysis of the resulting statements (e.g. Lee and Kirkpatrick 2004; Wilkinson et al 
2004). While these things are worthy of analysis, in this paper we explore what role as-
sessments play in the wider policy-making process. We assess their influence through 
examining the uses to which evidence generated within formal ex ante assessments is 
put. In the past, the consensus has generally been that policy assessment and evalua-
tion had only very limited effect on policy decisions (Weiss 1999, Owens et al 2004). 
The proliferation of policy assessment makes it even more important than ever to pose 
and seek to answer “fundamental questions… about the nature of appraisal and its role 
in the political process” (Owens et al 2004, p1944). In principle, we might expect the 
increased uptake of policy level procedures to have altered this somewhat pessimistic 
picture. First, previous assessment processes tended to be ‘end of pipe’ – conducted 
when there was less in policy terms to play for. Recent efforts to 'upstream' assessment 
into the earlier stages of decision-making and to link it more strongly into central level 
policy making should have opened opportunities for knowledge-induced policy 
change. Second, the problem was traditionally cast in terms of how to get policy mak-
ers to listen to knowledge developed externally by scientists (Nutley et al 2007). Ex ante 
policy assessment, in contrast, requires policy makers themselves to collate and evalu-
ate evidence before making policy. On the other hand, the new assessment procedures 
are still firmly rooted in a positivist view of public policy-making. They are designed in 
a way that corresponds with a rational model of problem solving based on a conception 
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of a linear policy process. Typically, the handbooks and guidance disseminated to pol-
icy makers set out a sequence of analytical steps that policy assessments should follow. 
These clearly mirror the same linear, rational phases as conventional planning guide-
lines and lower level forms of assessment such as Environmental Impact Assessment. 
The process normally begins with the identification of a policy problem or objective, 
runs through an analysis of options and respective impacts and leads to a weighing up 
of alternatives with a final selection of the 'best' policy choice (see for example OECD 
1997 and CEC 2005). In this conception, policy assessment is - at least implicitly - based 
on a number of assumptions about the policy process and the role of knowledge within 
it. For example, it suggests that policies are designed to address identified problems or 
objectives, that the impacts of planned policies can be anticipated with a certain degree 
of accuracy, that there is a central decision-maker who selects a policy option on the 
basis of expected net benefits and that ‘better’ information necessarily leads to more 
‘rational’ policies. 
It is curious that the basic rationale for, and design of, policy assessment has been so 
little affected by at least three decades of research in political science, sociology, ad-
ministrative studies and other disciplines that have fundamentally questioned the tra-
ditional view of both the policy process and the role of policy analysis. Without at-
tempting to summarise varied and complex bodies of literature, three main aspects can 
be highlighted. First, most scholars of political science would argue that while the pol-
icy cycle may under certain circumstances be a useful heuristic device, a rational, linear 
conception of the policy process is not an empirically robust model (Sabatier and Jen-
kins-Smith 1993). Influential authors emphasise that political decision-making is char-
acterised by discontinuities, dynamic change and a loose coupling between problems 
and policies (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, Kingdon 1995). Second, it has long been 
accepted that there is usually no unitary decision-maker or central steering mecha-
nism. Instead, policy decisions are the outcome of complex actor and interest constel-
lations and the range of available policy options is limited by institutional path-
dependencies and actor constellations (e.g. Sabatier, 1999). Third, knowledge is seen to 
have a far more varied role in the policy process than the positivist model would sug-
gest (deLeon 1997, see also Owens, 2004). A range of authors with a more post-positivist 
orientation emphasise the important role of ideas, argumentation and discourse in 
shaping policy debates and ultimately decision-making (Majone 1989, Fischer and For-
ester 1993). In this view, knowledge is not merely constituted by factual information, 
that is generated to help solve problems. Instead, knowledge is strategically used by 
different actors - typically in competitive fashion - to structure policy problems and 
solutions, to advance their positions, and to gain influence (see also Radaelli 1995). 
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This increasingly visible discrepancy has led to intense discussions in the literature 
(e.g. Cashmore 2004). Consequently, many authors have called for new 'participatory' or 
'critical' forms of policy analysis and assessment (deLeon 1992; 1997; Fischer 1993, 
Dryzek 1990). Others have pointed to the pointed to the (perceived) failure of the post-
positivist camp to develop approaches that go beyond an analysis of competing frames, 
claims and norms and help translate these into collective decision-making (van Eeten, 
1999). 
In a recent paper, Owens et al (2004) have rejected the polarisation between the techni-
cal-rational model and its post-positivist critique on the basis of both empirical and 
theoretical grounds. They challenge the common post-positivist view that policy analy-
sis must be fundamentally reinvented to fulfil this role, suggesting that learning op-
portunities may well be provided through the more traditional forms of policy analysis. 
They claim that "experience suggests that even quite technical procedures have, as an 
unintended effect, provided important apertures for deliberation and learning" (p. 
1950) between different frames and coalitions. However, they see the need for much 
empirical work to better understand whether such a role exists today and under what 
conditions it might be possible in the future. This paper explores the scope for initiat-
ing deliberation and learning through some of the policy-level assessment procedures 
that are now proliferating in OECD countries. More specifically, it focuses on routi-
nised ex ante assessment activities undertaken or initiated by policy making units in 
the administrative parts of government. The analysis is organised around four research 
questions: 
1. How is the role of assessment conceptualised in the four jurisdictions and what is 
the stated purpose of the procedure? Here, our main reference points are the legal 
frameworks and guidance documents published by different parts of government. 
The aim is to validate our assumption that the dominant model of policy-level as-
sessment is still that of technical-rational analysis. 
2. To what extent does policy level assessment follow the formal rules defined by pro-
cedural guidelines and handbooks? Where do we find variation and why? Specific at-
tention is given to whether a gap between rational procedures and messy policy 
processes is manifest in practice. 
3. Which function(s) does ex ante assessment fulfil in practice? Does it serve different 
functions for different actors? Here, we aim to explore in more depth whether we 
can indeed detect the opportunities for policy learning referred to by Owens et al. 
(2004) or whether other functions are dominant. 
4. Which factors determine the function of assessment practice in the policy-making 
process? Is there systematic variation between policy areas, instruments and actors? 
This question aims to draw out generic explanations of the results. 
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While most of the policy assessment literature has focussed on comparative accounts 
of the proliferation of assessment procedures, other social science branches have 
dwelled deeper into science-policy interface. Several decades of research into the use of 
knowledge in policy-making has suggested that the relationship is far from simple. 
The early literature - often referred to as the 'study of knowledge utilisation' - has 
grappled with the finding that knowledge is often not used a basis for decision-
making, for example in health, social or education policy (e.g. Caplan et al 1975, Knorr 
1977, Francis et al 1980, Corwin and Seashore Louis, 1982, Deshpande 1981). Studies ex-
amining social science more broadly as well as evaluations or assessments concluded 
that decision-makers rarely 'learned' from knowledge in a straightforward way. The 
reasons put forward to explain this phenomenon fall into two broad categories. First, a 
wide range of barriers are identified that impede the flow of information from re-
searchers to decision-makers. Amongst the many obstacles that have been observed are, 
for example: shortcomings of the research itself, problems in spelling out findings in 
an accessible and relevant way, lack of dissemination or access to policy and the related 
questions of resources, skills and incentives or the transformation of messages during 
communication process (Romsdahl 2005). Second, it was observed that decision-makers 
often use knowledge to suit their own interest (Owens, 2005). While studies emphasise 
different aspects and individual authors apply different terminologies, three types of 
knowledge use emerge from the knowledge utilisation literature (cf. Weiss (1999: 470) 
and Romsdahl (2005: 141)): 
• Conceptual learning: Knowledge plays the role of 'enlightening' policy-makers in the 
sense that it provides new information, ideas and perspectives into the policy sys-
tem. This may include challenging existing beliefs and opening up opportunities for 
policy change. 
• Instrumental learning: Knowledge is put to use for concrete decisions in the sense 
of specific information to improve the design of policies and provide rational guid-
ance. 
• Political use: Knowledge is put forward to attain political objectives, typically as a 
way of providing justification for a decision already taken, disarming an opponent’s 
view point, or postponing a decision.  
More recent studies have taken as a starting point the awareness that research can be 
used in different ways by different actors. The suggestion is that learning is underval-
ued because actors anticipate certain instrumental uses that are typically not achiev-
able. Instead, social scientists and evaluators should be more realistic about the influ-
ences their work can have on policy-making: "When evaluators can add to the knowl-
edge available, so much the better, but their knowledge is just one form out of many, 
and it has to compete for a hearing with other knowledge in circulation. [...] A study, 
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however, large and competent, does not sweep all before it and impose a new formula-
tion upon the policy-forming community" (Weiss 1999: 471). This has led to a more op-
timistic view that has tried to trace the more subtle long-term learning effects (for ex-
ample Bulmer 1987, Anderson and Biddle 1991). These studies tended to find that as-
sessments have an important role in policy formation but usually over the longer term. 
It has, however, been recognised that these slow effects can be extremely difficult to 
trace to the point of being 'invisible to the naked eye' (Weiss 1999). 
Although the research presented in this paper follows a similar line of enquiry, it dif-
fers from the bulk of the literature cited above in that it considers the role of essentially 
internal assessment procedures. As ex ante policy assessment as defined here are di-
rectly undertaken or at least commissioned by the unit that are in charge of policy, the 
questions around barriers to knowledge dissemination play only a very small role. Our 
focus on internal assessments therefore allows us to focus on exploring the different 
uses of assessment knowledge and their determinants within the policy-making arena. 
Although our research has moved on from the more rationalist perspective of the ear-
lier knowledge utilisation literature, their empirically based typologies of knowledge 
use remain valid and will be used to analyse the empirical material. 'Political use' will, 
however, be understood not as negative divergence from the rational model (i.e. the 
strategic misuse of information) but more neutral as a category that explores the extent 
to which knowledge has become an object of political negotiation. 
In order to explore these types of use we focus on policy assessments undertaken or 
initiated by the administrative parts of government in three countries (Germany, Swe-
den and the United Kingdom) and in the European Commission. We have chosen 
these jurisdictions because, although all have adopted some form of policy assessment 
and a central coordinating unit (Radaelli & De Francesco, 2007), the systems vary in 
relation to formalisation, institutional set-up and overall orientation. For the sake of 
convenience we refer to them all as ‘policy assessment’. We opted to focus on a selec-
tion of 37 policy cases which cover a broad range of policy sectors and types of policy 
intervention (e.g. regulations, strategies, economic instruments, see Table 1). The larger 
number of cases studied in the EU is due to the fact that the Commission's more 
transparent approach allowed us to carry out more cases using the same resources. 
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Cases analysed 
EU  
(17 cases,  
22 interviews) 
• Groundwater Daughter Directive 
• Framework Decision on the Principle of Availability 
• Capital Adequacy Directive 
• Communication on winning the battle against global climate 
change 
• Framework Programme on Solidarity and management of Migra-
tion Flows 
• Environment and Health Action Plan 
• Directive on the retention of data 
• Directive on legal protection of designs 
• Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Work Programme 
• Regulation concerning the Visa Information System 
• Recast of the Gender Equality Directives 
• Regulation on Timber Imports 
• Regulation on Sugar Reform 
• Rural Development Strategy 
• Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution 
• Decision on FP7 for research 
• Directive on car taxation 
Germany 
(7 cases,  
18 interviews)  
• Farm Premium Law 
• Genetic Technology Law 
• Flood Protection Law 
• SEA laws 
• Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 
• 2005 Climate Change Programme 
• Federal Airport Concept 
Sweden  
(7 cases,  
14 interviews) 
• EC CO2 trading directive 
• Climate Change follow up study 
• Climate strategy 
• Public transport 
• Sustainable production and consumption patterns 
• Biofuels in transport sector 
• Transport taxation 
UK 
(7 cases,  
16 interviews)  
• Landfill Allowances Regulations 
• Kyoto project-based mechanisms and the EU ETS 
• Data capture and sharing powers for the border agencies 
• National Lottery Bill 
• NHS (Pharmaceutical Services) Regulations 
• Working Time in Road Transport 
• Offshore Petroleum Activities 
Table 1: Policy cases analysed in the four jurisdictions 
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For each jurisdiction, a study was completed comprising an analysis of the overall as-
sessment system, its origins and objectives, recent reforms, guidance documents etc.. 
These drew on two principal sources of data. First relevant documents (guidance on 
assessment, assessment reports, draft and final legal texts, policy documents and rele-
vant publications by external stakeholders) provided a broad basis for analysis. Second, 
tracing the creation and diffusion of knowledge in a multi-causal policy process could 
only be achieved through in-depth interviews with those at the centre of the processes. 
Semi-structured elite interviews with desk officers responsible for the policy in ques-
tion were identified as a principal data source. Overall, more than 60 interviews were 
conducted, 19 interviews with ‘generic’ stakeholders (i.e. actors involved in supporting 
and/or promoting assessment, or with an obvious stake in the process e.g. NGOs), 43 
desk officers (i.e. the officials that completed the assessments). 
The use of assessment knowledge in practice 
How is the role of assessment conceptualised? 
In the EU, the prevailing system of policy level assessment is Impact Assessment (IA). 
This system was introduced in 2002 and combines elements of Sustainability Impact 
Assessment with ongoing efforts to develop better RIA. It only applies to major new 
policy initiatives. New guidelines and a set of technical and operational handbooks 
were launched in 2005 (SEC (2005) 791). The basic conception of the procedure is in-
strumentally-rational, based on the familiar linear steps (SEC (2005) 791). However, this 
is significantly attenuated in several key respects: First, the policy documents clarify 
that the policy assessment process should be “an aid to political decision-making, not a 
substitute for it” (SEC (2005) 791: 4). The aim of the options analysis is put modestly: 
"This may then allow the conclusion to be drawn that one option stands out above the 
others." (SEC (2005) 791: 39). Second, the guidance draws attention to the limits of analy-
sis, reminding desk officers to "flag up uncertainties and assumptions in the final… 
report" (SEC (2005) 791: 39). Third, the importance of the analysis process is emphasised 
and consultation with stakeholders is considered a vital part of policy assessment. 
Stakeholders are not limited to providing information on impacts, but should be al-
lowed to express views on all stages of the policy assessment, including the nature of 
the problem and the objectives. 
Policy assessment in Germany is formally referred to as 'assessment of the effects of 
law’. It is set up as a rather narrow, downstream assessment of legal, administrative and 
budgetary aspects of proposed new laws. Implementation is weak and comprehensive 
guidance was only introduced very recently. The requirements are briefly set out in the 
Joint Rules of Procedure of the federal ministries which essentially state that all sig-
nificant effects of new laws have to be assessed by the lead ministry in cooperation with 
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other concerned ministries and with input from relevant stakeholders. Although the 
objectives remain implicit, the focus is on ensuring that the costs of the law or regula-
tion are justified by its benefits. The stated aim is to 'identify the best regulation alter-
native' (BMI, 2006: 3) through nine successive assessment steps, with the core element 
being the 'assessment and comparison of benefits and costs'. Another indication of the 
rationalist conception of assessment in Germany is that guidance documents say al-
most nothing about the process of analysis. It is understood as an expert and knowl-
edge-based process with a very small role for external actors. Stakeholders are only 
foreseen as passive providers of information about impacts.  
Policy assessment in Sweden dates back to the 1970s, but the prevailing system dates 
from 1995. It is not linked to policy formation but is intended to function at the level of 
the implementing agencies. Although some provisions for assessment at the ministry 
level have been suggested, the more important arena for assessment and connecting 
knowledge to policymaking is the system of Committees of Inquiry. These committees 
are temporary bodies set up by ministries to comprehensively review the state-of-the-
art knowledge of the policy issues at hand and make proposals to the government. Each 
committee typically lasts for 1 to 3 years, creating more or less concrete proposals for 
strategies or polices. The official guidance sets out good practice, but does not give 
specific guidance, for example on methods and tools. The guidance conceptualises as-
sessment as an instrumental process but this is attenuated. For example, the scope and 
focus of individual assessment is clarified by the specific instructions issued by the 
ministry ‘client’ vis-à-vis options and impacts to be considered. Furthermore, political 
parties are represented in all major committees, and final recommendations are nego-
tiated politically. This means that it is less positivist in the sense that it does not make 
a strict separation between knowledge generation and political decision making. 
In the UK, RIA is the main policy assessment system. This is centrally driven by the 
Cabinet Office. The system predominantly aims to serve the ‘better regulation’ agenda 
through producing an “assessment of the impact [on business, charity or the voluntary 
sector] of policy options in terms of the costs, benefits and risks of a proposal” (Cabinet 
Office, 2003: para. 1.1). The official guidance clearly conceptualises assessment as a ra-
tional and linear process (Cabinet Office, 2007)., although it emphasises that it should 
be a continuous process starting at the earliest stage of the policy making process. On 
the other hand, the guidance acknowledges that policy assessment should not be a 
purely expert-based activity. The aim of consultation is not just to provide relevant in-
formation, but also to increase transparency, public buy-in and participation (Cabinet 
Office, without date).
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To what extent does policy level assessment follow formal rules and guidelines? 
With respect to the EU, although policy assessment has improved the transparency of 
European rule-making, it does not achieve the ambitious objective of basing policy de-
cisions on robust, integrated assessment knowledge. Actual policy assessment practice 
is biased towards economic impacts and administrative costs. Unintended conse-
quences and those in other policy areas tend to be neglected and the quality of analysis 
varies widely. Tool use is rather limited, with a focus on very simple tools such as 
checklists. The extent and quality of consultation varies from case to case, but often the 
perspectives included are from the established stakeholders who have been involved in 
the policy area before. Many - although not all - assessments justify policy proposals 
that are to a large extent already determined. Policy assessment is often therefore per-
ceived as having a narrow purpose, namely that of informing the detailed policy design 
and achieving greater societal buy-in. Fundamentally different options (including the 
‘no action’ alterative) are rarely considered, let alone explored fully.  
In practice, the German procedure is only partially and often formalistically imple-
mented. The framing tends to be extremely narrow; typically, it only addresses admin-
istrative costs, direct economic costs and price effects. In many cases, it is considered 
as an 'annoying duty'1 that has to be met with minimal effort. Actual analysis is in some 
cases replaced by pre-set sentences, for example 'the costs cannot be quantified' or 'al-
ternatives: none'. This minimalist attitude is, however, not universal. In a considerable 
number of cases, efforts are made - some times due to pressure from the Economic 
Affairs and Finance Ministries - to assess economic and administrative costs. Where 
this is done, the assessment tends to rely on figures provided by stakeholders, often 
remaining incomplete. There also appears to be a strong reluctance to include condi-
tional or uncertain information. Although the exact timing varies, policy assessment is 
typically a one-off activity towards the end of the policy formulation process. The pol-
icy assessment documentation rarely contains any information about the way in which 
analysis was carried out, options rejected, parties consulted, underlying assumptions 
etc. Stakeholders are not usually involved except - in some cases - as a passive source of 
data. While policy assessment does not function as an ex ante policy assessment sys-
tem, it should be mentioned that there are other, often extensive assessment activities 
which surround the policy-formulation process at federal level. The remain, however, 
outside the context of the formal policy assessment procedure, but are typically carried 
out in an ad hoc, informal, fragmented manner which is not transparent to outsiders. 
In practice the generic guidance in Sweden plays a very minor role compared to the 
specific instructions given to each committee by the ministry. In most cases, the guid-
                                                 
1  Interview no. 2, Germany, Environment Ministry. 
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ance is followed in the sense that each impact category is briefly assessed or at least 
mentioned, but they receive only minimal attention. The actual use of the ‘Committee 
Handbook’ is also low (Regeringskansliet, 2005). In practice, the specific instructions to 
the committees frame the assessment. This has a formal component; that is the pub-
licly available written instructions issued by the government, and an informal one, that 
is the continuous contacts between the Committee secretariat and the ministry. There 
are few formal requirements regarding participation and consultations, methods or 
tools, or ways in which the committee results should be used. Weaknesses in these re-
gards therefore cannot be attributed to an implementation failure. On the contrary, 
most committees appear to be very good on delivering what the ministry requests of 
them. 
Our research confirms other critical accounts of the UK’s policy assessment system, for 
example by the UK’s National Audit Office (The National Audit Office, 2006) that while 
compliance with the requirement to produce policy assessment is high, and they re-
main narrowly focused on direct economic cost. There is a ‘silo mentality’ regarding 
different issues (e.g. environment, race, etc), but many desk officers also hold the view 
that the function of policy assessment is to justify the burden on business and citizens 
created by regulation. Narrowing the assessment to what are perceived to be a smaller 
number of critical categories provide a means of tailoring the assessment process to a 
department’s core policy objectives and saves administrative resources. The policy as-
sessment process is weak at exploring different ways of meeting a policy goal. In our 
sample, policy assessments did not radically change the overall direction of policy: “it 
is often squeezed in at the very end”2. Consequently, policy assessments tend to contain 
a limited range of options, sometimes artificial constructions created to comply with 
the requirements: “often [this] is disguised by analysing different options which deliver 
similar results”3. We found that informal consultation with key groups tends to occur 
before and in parallel with the public consultation process.  
Which function(s) does ex ante assessment fulfil in practice? 
In many of the cases analysed, policy assessment in the EU engendered a certain degree 
of instrumental learning, but this was limited by the boundaries set by the problem 
definition and by previous policy commitments. The impact of assessment knowledge 
on policy design was very small compared to lobbying and political negotiations. One 
factor that limits the potential for conceptual learning is the narrow focus of the analy-
sis because it means that policy assessment often confirms what protagonists know 
already. In nearly all the cases examined, policy assessment had little effect on stake-
                                                 
2  Interview, UK “Case B” 
3  Interview, UK ”Case E” 
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holder positions. An element which favours the political use of assessment is the lack 
of data, particular if the impacts of the policy are played out on the national and re-
gional level. The use of incomplete data sets and inevitable reliance on speculative as-
sumptions can is some cases lead to contradictory results and more room for political 
use of knowledge. In some cases, data have to be obtained from actors - such as the in-
dustry to be regulated - which have an interest in a particular policy outcome. While 
the high transparency of the policy assessment system appears to have supported 
learning processes, it has also given interest groups the opportunity to engage in po-
litical use of knowledge. In several cases, lobby groups have consciously tried to influ-
ence decisions by contributing to the assessment, by criticising it or by providing al-
ternative figures. Whether the comparatively inclusive policy assessment process has 
promoted consensus amongst stakeholders remains doubtful. In the most politicised 
cases, anecdotal evidence suggests that it may actually have led to more entrenched 
positions. 
Very few resources are devoted to formal RIA in Germany and there is a high degree of 
political use of knowledge. Both the typically late timing of the policy assessment and 
also the way the results are presented suggest that it tends to be an ex post justification 
exercise rather than an activity that influences decision-making. This was confirmed by 
interviewees: 'The RIA is just a little hoop we have to jump through. [...] We try to assess 
the costs because we are required to do it’.'4 More interesting and varied is the use of 
the knowledge from informal assessment activities. In most cases, significant resources 
were devoted to external studies, workshops, expert groups or internal analysis. These 
activities tended to result in instrumental learning, mostly about the detailed design of 
the policy. Conceptual learning in the sense of a more fundamental re-thinking only 
occurred in one of the seven cases. Political use of knowledge by the lead ministry as 
well as by other ministries and external stakeholders could be observed in the majority 
of cases. The interplay between science and policy is commonly neither purely instru-
mentally-rational nor purely political: 'Scientific input plays an important role, but not 
in a straightforward way. Everybody has their own researchers. There is a certain com-
petition [about claims and research input], we use our own budgets to commission 
studies that substantiate the interests of the different ministries’'5 
In Sweden, most committees engage in comprehensive instrumental fact finding. 
There is a fair amount of both instrumental and conceptual learning among its mem-
bers. In relation to actual decision-making processes, however, the knowledge is pri-
marily used politically. This has several reasons: First, the instructions to Committees 
                                                 
4  Interview no. 2, Germany, Environment Ministry. 
5  Interview no. 3, Germany, Environment Ministry. 
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are developed by the ministry in charge which means that problem framings, policy 
directions and key priorities are set out in advance. Second, the knowledge has difficul-
ties ‘creeping in’. The key function of the committee is not learning but to build a po-
litical consensus by navigating between established political positions. In ‘parliamen-
tary’ committees, political negotiations between the political parties are the basis for 
the recommendations to the government, implying that they are already backed by a 
parliamentary majority. Agency officials and experts tend to be excluded from the final 
negotiations and proposals. In ‘expert’ committees where politicians are not directly 
involved, the political negotiation might take place after the ministry has received the 
proposals. Expert committees are also normally highly perceptive to the political con-
text and anchor the proposals at the political level through continuous contacts with 
the political parties and the government. Hence in both parliamentary and expert 
committees, the political aspects of assessment knowledge use are even more accentu-
ated in practice than the formal guidance implies. There is, however, variation over 
time within the process as the political dimension becomes stronger towards the end 
of the process. Our interviewees have reported very intricate political processes within 
and around the committees, including activities to influence outcomes by withholding 
of information, by scheduling committee inquiries after decisions had already been 
made politically, and by selecting expert members to ensure certain outcomes. At ear-
lier stages, most committees engage in a relatively comprehensive and unbiased fact 
finding. The political bargaining between the political parties about what to recom-
mend is, however, often disjointed from the assessment process. 
In practice, the focus of the analysis on direct economic and administrative costs 
means that there is usually little or no scope for conceptual learning in the UK. Under-
taking a comprehensive policy assessment is seen as too complex and time consuming. 
Policy assessment is also not used as an instrument to highlight and explore trade-offs, 
these are - on the contrary - rather downplayed. Major decisions are usually made po-
litically and often before the policy assessment is carried out. Instrumental learning 
occurs in some cases, but typically only in relation to details. Political use is more 
dominant as the assessment of direct costs (and, to a lesser extent, benefits) often func-
tions as a way of justifying and providing transparency about the impacts of the pre-
decided policy. Moreover, “policy people are very risk averse and often choose the solu-
tion that is safest and most uncontroversial”6. Both conceptual and instrumental learn-
ing are also limited by what some desk officers perceive as a rather artificial nature of 
policy assessments; i.e. that they require a formal assessment of (sometimes unrealistic) 
policy options even though in most cases the issues were already known about. There 
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is little evidence that stakeholders altering their pre-conceived positions based on pol-
icy assessments. 
What factors determine the function of assessment practice? 
In the EU, we found that the Commission's policy assessment procedure broadly fol-
lows the instrumental-rational model, but that guidance documents promote a rela-
tively process-conscious assessment approach which recognises the limits of rational 
analysis. On the other hand, we established that policy assessment practice does not 
usually conform to the ambitious goals in terms of scope of analysis and variety of 
methods. The involvement of stakeholders is somewhat limited, although it still goes 
much beyond practice in the other jurisdictions. We found a dominance of small-scale 
instrumental learning, some instances of political use of knowledge and several cases 
where policy assessment did not play any significant role. 
There are several potential explanations for the apparent failure to widen the scope of 
assessment and using more diverse methodologies: First, there are inherent difficulties 
in analysing broader impacts. Even when policy units are willing to go beyond an 
analysis of direct costs, they are confronted with complexities, uncertainties, shortage 
of data and a lack of well-established assessment methods. This is reinforced by a risk-
averse attitude of policy officials and a desire for quantification and monetisation of 
impacts. Second, the organisational culture which frames the work of the lead DG gov-
erns the focus of its assessments. Given the difficulties making clear causal links be-
tween policies and impacts, assessments focus on effects in key areas of departmental 
interests. Third, the availability financial resources, time and technical knowledge is a 
significant constraint. Fourth, some desk officers also see policy assessment as an in-
appropriate or unnecessary requirement, particularly in relation to specific issues and 
instruments. Hence the approach in these cases is predominantly about demonstrating 
that the policy assessment requirements have been completed. Fifth, many decisions 
are based on pre-existing legal or political commitments: “You don’t sit down with a 
blank sheet”.7 Finally, the dominant political priorities - namely the concern about 
Europe's competitiveness - are shaping the focus of assessment. All those factors have 
limited the role of policy assessment in most cases to instrumental learning about nar-
row design options and implementation pathways. In some cases where the assessment 
was carried out at a late stage, it did not have any effect. 
All these above factors contribute to a considerable gap between the prescribed policy 
assessment procedure and actual processes of assessment and decision-making. It con-
cerns particularly the very limited ability of desk officers to actually assess impacts and 
                                                 
7  Interview, EU, “Case E” 
 
RATIONALISING THE POLICY MESS? 16 
the fact the prescribed process of an open options assessment contrasts with a much 
more constrained reality. In some cases, lack of knowledge and policy options is explic-
itly recognised in policy assessment reports. In other cases, the gap is rather concealed 
by assessing certain unrealistic options and by not being explicit about the limitations 
of analysis (e.g. assumptions and sensitivities).  
In Germany, our analysis showed that the prevailing policy assessment procedure cor-
responds most closely to the instrumentally-rational model, but also that the imple-
mentation gap is particularly large. Formal policy assessment either produces little 
knowledge and or produces it for political use. This appears to have strengthened in-
formal assessment activities that have taken over some of the instrumental learning 
functions that policy assessment is supposed to have. 
A key reason for the weakness of formal policy assessment seemed to be that key actors 
do not have an interest in transparent assessment practices. Politicians often see policy 
assessment as restricting their discretion as ministers or parliamentarians. As changes 
to a proposed policy are commonly portrayed as sign of political weakness, ministers 
focus on defending the suggested measure from fairly early stages. Policy-makers in 
ministries tend to see it as counterproductive to their effort to push a legislative pro-
posal through the legislative process. It seems plausible that this effect is particularly 
strong in the German political system. Major stakeholder groups with access to minis-
tries also tend to benefit from informal processes. Some stakeholders also expressed 
reservations about being drawn into legitimising an assessment the outcomes of which 
may be unacceptable to them. Given these fundamental barriers, any formal policy as-
sessment system would face resistance, but the research suggest that the rationalist 
approach of the current procedure adds specific problems. Most importantly, unrealis-
tic ideals about the processes of defining objectives and exploring alternatives make 
desk officers uneasy and sometimes cynical about the procedure. While policy assess-
ment understands policy as a rational problem-solving activity, the daily reality of the 
officials is one in which a political bargaining logic is very important (and in some 
cases dominant). The expectation that impacts can be anticipated and should be pre-
cise ironically leads to the effect that much relevant information is not included be-
cause it does not live up to this ideal. Finally, the lack of attention given to process is-
sues can also be partly explained by the conception that policy assessment is a purely 
expertise-based activity. The lack of knowledge input and validation by stakeholders 
contributes to the low quality of policy assessment. 
In Sweden we find that the formal guidance emphasises an instrumental role for the 
knowledge but also that the set up explicitly recognises the political dimensions in way 
that distinguishes it from the other jurisdictions. In practice, this political aspect is 
 
RATIONALISING THE POLICY MESS? 17 
even further accentuated. The instrumental and political uses of assessments that 
dominate the Swedish cases are strongly linked to the particular institutional arrange-
ments surrounding the 'committee of inquiry' system. First of all, the institutional 
separation between the committee and the ministry creates a gap between knowledge 
and policymaking. Second, resource and time limitations clearly play in: in most cases, 
the resources available are too tight to allow broader explorations. Another factor is the 
strong framing of the assessment as a result of the ministry’s organizational goals and 
the connected narrow selection of participants and their expertise. The written instruc-
tions and informal steering of the process precludes conceptual learning because it is 
so strongly geared towards political decision making, not learning. 
However, it must be noted that the rules surrounding committees usually provide vari-
ous stakeholders the opportunity to bring 'their' knowledge to the table, which opens 
for more political uses as well as learning between different interest groups. Indeed, as 
in Germany the political bargaining logic dominates committee processes more than 
the instrumental rationality that permeates the official guidance: even when commit-
tees are of 'expert' rather than 'parliamentary' types, they still need to anchor their pro-
posals politically to ensure that it can sail through the ministry and parliamentary 
processes.  
The Swedish experiences therefore suggests that the political uses cannot be clearly 
separated from conceptual uses: a fair amount of 'enlightenment' sometimes occur 
among the members of the committees as they are confronted with and forced to as-
similate various stakeholder positions, knowledge and perspectives. As noted, the insti-
tutional separation between the committee and the ministry however constrains the 
wider uptake of this enlightenment. This institutional separation therefore presents 
both opportunities and risks. 
Finally, in the UK, policy assessment follows a model of economic rationality, but the 
guidance emphasises the importance of an iterative and transparent process. Policy 
documents express a high level of confidence in the ability of economic analysis to 
help choose the 'best policy option'. Actual policy assessment reports, however, focus 
on impacts that can be easily quantified, thereby only giving a very limited view of costs 
and benefits that mostly fulfils a role of narrow instrumental learning. Political use of 
policy assessment knowledge largely occurs in the sense of legitimising decisions that 
have already been taken. In spite of extensive compliance with consultation require-
ments, stakeholders do not tend to engage with the assessment because of a (perceived 
or actual) lack of expertise and because policy assessment is not seen as having a major 
impact on decisions. 
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The focus on economic impacts and administrative costs is a clear consequence of the 
dominance of the competitiveness paradigm in the UK. The Better Regulation Com-
mission, which is located in the very heart of government and has the explicit and high 
level political support, promotes policy assessment as primarily a means to achieve the 
political target of reducing regulatory burden. Consequently, issues that by their very 
nature require varying degrees of regulatory intervention (e.g. the environment) risk 
being marginalised in the assessment process. In addition, in many cases the objectives 
are already defined by EU law or existing policies which are only slightly amended. In 
the case of significant new policies, the goals often derive from senior bureaucrats or 
from Ministers, who “try to make their names by proposing big regulations”8. The re-
sult is that “[following an policy assessment] Ministers won’t thank you if you don’t 
come up with what they want”9. The mismatch between the ambitions of policy as-
sessment and the practice of policy-making is also obvious. Compared to the EU, how-
ever, policy assessment reports and desk officers are much more open about the fact 
that direct economic and administrative costs are the main focus of assessment. 
Conclusions 
This paper set out to analyse whether the uptake of ex ante assessment of policies is 
capable of providing new opportunities for knowledge to inform processes of policy 
deliberation and learning. It also investigated how far the conceptualisation and use of 
policy assessment systems reflect different models of the use of evidence in policy-
making. Despite considerable differences in administrative culture, institutional con-
text and procedural design, the intended role of ex ante policy assessment in the four 
jurisdictions is actually broadly similar. All four aim to provide technical information 
to help policy-makers select the best policy option – i.e. an instrument to make policy 
more rational. Only in the case of the European Commission's IA system have post-
positivist ideas left a noticeable impression on the assessment guidance, particularly in 
relation to processes and recommended methods. But how are these assessment pro-
cedures applied in the real world of policy-making? 
The practice of policy assessment is contingent upon the political context. Assessment 
processes and outcomes vary both between and within the four jurisdictions. Overall, 
we have seen that knowledge serves a range of functions and that these functions fre-
quently vary between actors and over time. With the exception of cases where there was 
no significant production of knowledge (because assessment was not done at all or 
done formalistically), ex ante policy assessment led to a significant degree of instru-
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mental learning. This normally concerned the detailed policy design and tended to be 
selective in the sense that it focused on achieving the desired political objectives at the 
lowest possible economic and administrative costs. This does not, however, imply that 
policy assessment achieves its aims of 'rationalising the policy mess'. Generally, we 
found that while these assessments informs policy designs at the margins, but it was 
the political context that dominated the structure and outcome of decision processes. 
In the large majority of cases, a range of constraints meant that the assessment proce-
dure could not play the role of steering the decision-making process that is foreseen in 
guidance documents. The strength and type of constraints varied but tended to include 
political commitments, legal requirements, the positions of powerful stakeholders, 
public opinion and existing legal and institutional frameworks. If the policy choice was 
limited by these factors, administrations had little motivation to commit resources to 
an assessment of options and impacts. Consequently, assessments were then primarily 
used in relation to narrow policy design issues or to justify a policy. 
While in some cases assessments have made contributions to broader policy change, 
we found few examples of conceptual learning where an assessment fundamentally 
challenged problem definitions or policy approaches. This can partly be explained by 
the narrow scope of assessment that tended to ignore unintended consequences and 
hidden or external costs. Particularly in Germany and the UK, the analysis tends to fo-
cus on direct economic and administrative costs, a conception that does not provide 
much space for reflections on problem framings, causal effects, alternative measures 
and so on. Furthermore, the examined assessments take place over relatively short time 
scales, typically ranging from a few weeks to one or two years. It is well-established in 
the literature that conceptual policy learning processes require more extended time 
frames. 
Significantly we found a variety of more political uses of knowledge; indeed, enough 
variety to break the concept down into several distinct categories. Most common in the 
analysed cases was a form of use that could be termed justificatory. Here, the lead min-
istry uses the assessment report to justify a specific measure on the basis of its superi-
ority over alternative courses of action and/or its positive cost-benefit ratio. This type 
of knowledge use is often criticised as it can be used to make the case for decisions that 
have been made on other grounds (e.g. special political or economic interests). On the 
other hand, it serves an important transparency function and is often defended by desk 
officers as a legitimate and necessary way of explaining a chosen course of action. Simi-
larly, other actors (such as sector ministries or interest groups) often use or produce 
assessment knowledge for their political purposes, e.g. by putting forward cost esti-
mates, reinterpreting data or assessing certain types of impacts that were not covered 
by the assessment. This type of strategic use of knowledge can also take legitimate 
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forms of broadening the knowledge base as well as introducing undue bias through the 
conscious manipulation of evidence (e.g. in the form of overstating the costs of regula-
tion). Strategic use tended to occur in relation to issues with high 'decision stakes' 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). In some cases, assessment processes even became an ad-
ditional venue for conflict. This was particularly the case if key actors had the expertise 
and information to engage in a factual discussion and if knowledge claims could be 
used to support their position. In other cases, however, we observed that assessment 
processes became largely irrelevant in the face of intense political controversy: 'Once 
the debate has become heated, stakeholders - us included- don't actually look at the 
facts anymore, but they fall into an adversarial pattern.'10 Interestingly, both officials 
and stakeholders often considered themselves as one of the more fact-oriented and 
'rational' actors and accused other players of using research in a biased and strategic 
way. While this attitude may be part of the political game, it points towards a phe-
nomenon of competing rationalities and blurred boundaries between science and pol-
icy, facts and norms. Finally, we also observed a few cases where the production and use 
of assessment knowledge also served to signal a political response to a perceived prob-
lem in the absence of actual policy measures (for example when these are considered 
politically, legally, financially or technically unfeasible). As the behaviour has common-
alities the well-established phenomenon of symbolic legislation (see for example 
Dwyer, 1990), it can be referred to as symbolic knowledge use. 
Although it has, as Owens et al (2004) predicted, been difficult to gather systematic evi-
dence on this phenomenon, many of our cases suggest that the gap between the ‘ra-
tional’ conceptualisation of assessment, and the ‘messy reality’ of policymaking was in 
fact a barrier to learning. Put differently, we would argue that if learning occurred, this 
was despite, rather than because o , the instrumental conception of the procedure. We 
see at least three main indications of this conflictual relationship. First, the rational 
assessment model draws the attention of both desk officers and evaluators to the 'tech-
nical' elements of the assessment (for example the number of options studied, the de-
gree of quantification, data sources and so on). A conceptual learning approach, in con-
trast, would be expected to draw attention to the process, framing and scope of assess-
ment. The lack of reflection about which actors to be involved, at what stage and for 
what purpose meant that learning opportunities were often missed. Second, there was 
a notable reluctance to draw upon incomplete quantitative information or to use struc-
tured qualitative methods to describe impacts. This attitude can at least partly be ex-
plained by the positivist framing of policy assessment where precision, neutrality and 
comprehensiveness are the yardsticks. In practice, it leads to a narrowing down of as-
f
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sessment from a comprehensive approach to one focused on administrative and eco-
nomic aspects which can be assessed fairly reliably. Third, assessment procedures and 
guidance documents do not help desk officers define their difficult role at the interface 
between science and policy. Instead, they uncritically assign them the role of scientists 
that make policy decisions more rational. As a consequence, many of the officials we 
interviewed felt uneasy about and frustrated with assessment procedures that - in their 
view - has sometimes little to do with the 'way things work in practice'. This led in 
some cases to a minimalist 'tick box' attitude and viewing the assessment procedure 
not as a decision support instrument but as a bureaucratic hurdle. 
While the overall setting and structure of ex ante policy assessment mean that its po-
tential to foster broader policy learning is likely to remain limited, a design of proce-
dures that is more conscious of process and of limitations to knowledge should enable 
them to play a more important and positive role in policy-making. This paper has pro-
vided a start, but for the future, more longitudinal empirical studies will be required to 
better assess more subtle long-term learning effects. With time, we should be able to, if 
not rationalise the policy mess, at least establish the conditions under which evidence 
can play a more prominent and constructive role in political decision-making. 
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